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Sensitive biomedical data is often collected from distributed sources, involving different information
systems and different organizational units. Local autonomy and legal reasons lead to the need of privacy
preserving integration concepts. In this article, we focus on anonymization, which plays an important
role for the re-use of clinical data and for the sharing of research data. We present a ﬂexible solution
for anonymizing distributed data in the semi-honest model. Prior to the anonymization procedure, an
encrypted global view of the dataset is constructed by means of a secure multi-party computing (SMC)
protocol. This global representation can then be anonymized. Our approach is not limited to speciﬁc
anonymization algorithms but provides pre- and postprocessing for a broad spectrum of algorithms
and many privacy criteria. We present an extensive analytical and experimental evaluation and discuss
which types of methods and criteria are supported. Our prototype demonstrates the approach by imple-
menting k-anonymity, ‘-diversity, t-closeness and d-presence with a globally optimal de-identiﬁcation
method in horizontally and vertically distributed setups. The experiments show that our method
provides highly competitive performance and offers a practical and ﬂexible solution for anonymizing dis-
tributed biomedical datasets.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction There is a growing understanding of risks related to data shar-Collaboration and data sharing have become core elements of
biomedical research. Examples are international projects like the
International Cancer Genome Consortium ICGC with its goal to
‘‘make the data available to the entire research community’’ [1], and
BBMRI-LPC aiming ‘‘to help scientists to have better access to large
European studies on health’’ [2]. Also, from the perspective of public
funders, sharing of research data has become a request, and princi-
ples of sharing have been formulated [3,4]. Besides the interna-
tional projects mentioned above, there are research projects on
national, regional, and institutional levels, which collect, integrate,
and share data.
The process of managing data from collection to analyses and
also to sharing can be illustrated by different phases [5]. Research
data is collected and managed, which may be accompanied by fur-
ther processes, such as quality assurance. Sharing is initiated by
allowing other researchers to get an overview over available data
which ﬁt their research objectives. Typically, access to core data
is limited, and data access committees are involved before data
use agreements (DUAs) are signed and data is released. Then, this
data is integrated and used for new analyses.ing: disclosure of sensitive biomedical data may lead to harm for
individuals, especially when different sources are available for link-
age (for an overview see [6]). Basically, national laws and regula-
tions, such as the HIPAA Privacy Rule [7], as well as international
regulations, such as the European Directive on Data Protection
[8], mandate stringent protection of personal data. In recent years,
there has been extensive work on ethical, legal, social/societal is-
sues (ELSI) of biomedical and genomic research and on data sharing,
e.g., [9,10], which we will not further address in this article.
Anonymization is an important privacy measure when releasing
and sharing sensitive datasets. As an important example, the
HIPAA Privacy Rule has deﬁned concrete measures to prevent re-
identiﬁcation. These include methods of statistical disclosure con-
trol. Basically, fuzziness is introduced to a degree which balances
remaining semantics and usability against risk reduction. K-ano-
nymity is a well known and understood privacy criterion, focusing
on quasi-identiﬁers. These are attributes that are required for anal-
yses but are associated with a high risk of reidentiﬁcation. A data-
set is k-anonymous if each data item cannot be distinguished from
at least k 1 other data items regarding the quasi-identiﬁers [11].
Introducing k-anonymity is a measure against linkage attacks
which may lead to identity disclosure when accessible data is com-
bined with an attackers background knowledge [12].
Data is often collected from distributed sources, involving dif-
ferent types of data, different information systems, and different
organizational units. Pseudonymity is another privacy measure of
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data is separated from medical data, and the links between identi-
ﬁers and corresponding pseudonyms are secretly kept by a honest
broker [13]. In general, data can be distributed vertically or
horizontally. The former means that different sites hold different
subsets of the attributes for a common set of individuals, so pseu-
donymity is a typical example. The latter means that different sites
hold data with the same set of attributes for different individuals,
for example, data for individuals in their region. Health services re-
search is an example where integration of horizontally distributed
data is needed, and disclosure has to be prevented.
In this article, we will focus on anonymization of datasets which
are horizontally or vertically distributed. Existing approaches have
focused on limited sets of privacy criteria,which in practicemust of-
ten be combinedwith further criteria to prevent unintended disclo-
sure of sensitive data. In most cases, speciﬁc algorithms were
implemented which employ speciﬁc types of data transformations
and search strategies. In contrast, we see are requirement for ﬂexi-
ble solutions which allow the implementation of a broad spectrum
ofmethods.Here,we agreewith [14,15], that the suitability ofmeth-
ods depends on use cases. As efﬁcient generic solutions do not exist,
and as many approaches have unclear performance characteristics,
we will also address performance questions. They are of relevance
in situations which require near real-time updates, e.g. when the
course of an infectious disease is analyzed over different areas.1.1. Contributions
We will present a ﬂexible and efﬁcient approach to distributed
data anonymization in the semi-honest model. It is based upon a
secure multi-party computing (SMC) protocol, which constructs
an encrypted global view out of horizontally or vertically distrib-
uted datasets. To this global view a broad spectrum of anonymiza-
tion algorithms and privacy criteria can be applied. Thus,
centralized versions of a large number of data anonymization algo-
rithms are supported, and we will provide a detailed overview in
the discussion. We will show the ﬂexibility of our solution by
anonymizing data with a broad spectrum of privacy criteria,
including k-anonymity, ‘-diversity, t-closeness and d-presence,
using a globally optimal data anonymization algorithm. Most re-
lated approaches in the distributed setting implement heuristic
methods, as their coding models result in large search spaces.
While it has been shown that these heuristics combined with,
e.g., local recoding, can outperform optimal algorithms using sin-
gle-dimensional global recoding in terms of data quality, we chose
such an algorithm as these have said to be very well suited for the
biomedical domain [14].
We present an extensive analytical and experimental evalua-
tion of our solution and show that it offers highly competitive exe-
cution times. The performance of our approach can be accurately
estimated with a model that only depends on basic data character-
istics. Our protocol relaxes the guarantees of traditional secure
multiparty computations by exchanging non-anonymized – but
encrypted – subsets of the data. We present effective means to
lower privacy risks and discuss a trade-off between privacy, data
quality and efﬁciency. Together with estimates derived from our
model, this can be utilized to tailor our method to project speciﬁc
requirements.Fig. 1. Exemplary tabular generalization hierarchies (Lvl = level, m = male,
f = female).2. Background
2.1. Centralized anonymization algorithms
A typical approach for anonymization is to introduce fuzziness.
In this work, we focus on the most common transformationmethods: generalization and suppression. For an overview of fur-
ther techniques, such as perturbation or permutation, the inter-
ested reader is referred to [16].
Generalization is often implemented with generalization
hierarchies. These are transformation rules that allow to iteratively
generalize the values of an attribute. Tabular representations of
example hierarchies for the categorical attribute Gender with two
generalization levels and the discrete numerical attribute ZIP with
six generalization levels are shown in Fig. 1. Generalization hierar-
chies are well suited for transforming categorical attributes and
discrete numeric attributes. They can also be used for quasi-iden-
tiﬁers that are continuous numerical attributes. One solution is
to formulate transformation rules as functions that dynamically
create generalization hierarchies for the values of an attribute in
a speciﬁc dataset. A more detailed discussion of how such quasi-
identiﬁers can be handled with our method is given in Section 6.5.
Suppression is a special kind of generalization, in which a data item
is completely suppressed.
Many anonymization algorithms use the rules encoded in gen-
eralization hierarchies to transform a dataset. Depending on the
type of transformations applied, this results in differently large
search spaces. Some algorithms implement local recoding, while
others implement global recoding [17]. The former means that dif-
ferent rules can be applied to equal data items, whereas the latter
means that the same rule is applied. When single-dimensional
recoding is implemented, the data items are values of an individual
column, whereasmulti-dimensional recodingmeans that data items
are combinations of values from different columns, e.g., complete
tuples [17]. Multidimensional global recoding means that the same
rule is always applied to equal tuples. From the perspective of a
single attribute, this results in local recoding of its values.
The method of generalization can be distinguished into full-do-
main generalization or subtree generalization [16]. The former
means that the entire domain of a data item is transformed to a
more general domain (i.e., level) of its generalization hierarchy
[18]. The latter means that different generalization levels can be
applied to different subsets of data items from the same domain.
Generalization-based techniques are sometimes distinguished
by whether they are hierarchy-based or partition-based [17]. Parti-
tion-based algorithms are often used for continuous numerical
attributes and require the existence of a total order on the data
items. They generalize data items by partitioning them into ranges.
Hierarchy-based approaches are often used for categorical and dis-
crete numeric attributes and require the existence of generaliza-
tion hierarchies.
We will now present a short overview of a broad spectrum of
state-of-the-art anonymization algorithms. Apart from some
restrictions, most of them are supported by our approach. A de-
tailed discussion is presented in Section 6.2.
Optimal data anonymization algorithms often implement hier-
archy-based global recoding with single-dimensional full-domain
generalization to reduce the size of the search space. As this is a
restrictive coding model that potentially results in much loss of
information, suppression is added as a multi-dimensional global
recoding technique. As a result, outliers are removed from the
dataset as long as the total number of suppressed tuples remains
Fig. 2. Exemplary dataset.
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generalization to enforce the given privacy criteria. Examples in-
clude Incognito [19], OLA [14] or Flash [20].
Dataﬂy is an early algorithm that solves the k-anonymity prob-
lem with a greedy search strategy [21]. It implements single-
dimensional full-domain global recoding and uses the size of the
domain of an attribute as a heuristic for selecting the next attribute
to generalize.
Approaches that implement subtree-based generalization have
to deal with much larger search spaces and most of them therefore
implement heuristic strategies. Attribute Utility Motivated k-Anony-
mization (AUM) is a hierarchy-based approach proposed speciﬁ-
cally for biomedical data [22]. It uses multi-dimensional global
recoding and implements a heuristic search process. Top-Down
Specialization is also a heuristic algorithm that uses hierarchy-
and subtree-based generalization with single-dimensional global
recoding [23]. Mondrian [24] is a partition-based heuristic search
strategy that uses multi-dimensional global recoding.
Clustering algorithms implement local recoding and many are
hierarchy-based. The approaches from [25,26] and the Sequential
Clustering Algorithm from [15] use information derived from gener-
alization hierarchies as distance measures, while the algorithm
from [27] additionally uses generalization graphs that are built
automatically.
2.2. Privacy criteria
Various extensions of the k-anonymity criterion exist. Many
aim at preventing an attacker from learning sensitive information
about data subjects from a k-anonymized dataset. The most well-
known ones are ‘-diversity [28] and t-closeness [29]. LKC-privacy
has been proposed in work on distributed data anonymization
and is a relaxed abstraction of k-anonymity and ‘-diversity [30].
Moreover, the d-presence criterion aims at preventing attackers
from inferring the presence of an individuals’ tuple in a dataset
[31].
Some less wide-spread privacy criteria also exist. ða; kÞ-Ano-
nymity [32] and p-sensitive k-anonymity [33] aim at preventing
attackers from performing linkage attacks and from learning sensi-
tive associations at the same time, while ðk; eÞ-anonymity [34]
aims at protecting sensitive numeric attributes. ð;mÞ-Anonymity
[35] was proposed to protect sensitive numeric attributes from
proximity breaches. Such breaches allow attackers to learn that a
sensitive value falls in a certain interval with high probability.
ð; dÞk-Dissimilarity has been presented in [36] as a generalization
of such criteria and is thus a generic criterion for protecting data-
sets against general proximity breaches. m-Invariance [37] aims at
enabling the privacy-preserving re-release of data.
A criterion speciﬁc to distributed data anonymization is ‘-site-
diversity. Here, it is required that at least ‘ different parties con-
tribute a tuple to each equivalence class. The aim is to protect
the privacy of the sites, i.e., to prevent attackers from learning
which site has contributed which data [38].
In our examples we focus on k-anonymity but, depending on
which types of attributes from a dataset are incorporated into this
view, a multitude of the aforementioned privacy criteria can be en-
forced. A detailed discussion of this matter is presented in Sec-
tion 6.3. An example dataset and a 2-anonymous representation
are shown in Fig. 2. The transformation has been performed utiliz-
ing single-dimensional full-domain global recoding with the hier-
archies from Fig. 1.
2.3. Distributed data
Without loss of generality, we assume that the data is stored in
one table, where A ¼ fa1; . . . ; acg is a set of c attributes andT ¼ ft1; . . . ; trg is a set of r tuples over these attributes. The data
is distributed amongst n parties, P ¼ fp1; . . . ; png. In general, data
can be distributed horizontally or vertically. Horizontal distribution
means that the parties involved collect data with the same data-
base schema, but the data entries are from different data subjects,
i.e., that pi manages the tuples Tpi ¼ ftxj1 6 x 6 rg where
Tpy \ Tpx ¼£ for 1 6 y; x 6 n and y– x. Vertical distribution means
that the parties collect data for the same subjects, but each party
manages different attributes in different schemata, i.e., that pi
manages the attributes Api ¼ faxj1 6 x 6 cg where Apy \ Apx ¼£
for 1 6 y; x 6 n and y– x. In case of vertical distribution, the rela-
tionships between tuples in different subsets are represented by
a common tuple identiﬁer. A hybrid setup allows for arbitrary com-
binations of vertical and horizontal distribution.3. Materials
3.1. Basic methods
Jurczyk and Xiong [38] have described three different basic
methods of anonymizing distributed data. The integrate-and-
anonymize method is the simplest approach [30]. Here, the data
is ﬁrst integrated at a trusted party and then anonymized. As
the trusted party temporarily maintains a non-anonymized global
dataset, this approach is not feasible for many scenarios. For
example, the existence of a trusted party can often not be guaran-
teed. Moreover, the scientiﬁc sharing of non-anonymized individ-
ual-level health data requires data use agreements (DUAs), and it
must be covered by informed consents, which is not always the
case or feasible.
The basic idea of anonymize-and-integrate methods is to ﬁrst
anonymize all local data subsets and then integrate them into a
global dataset [30]. In case of horizontal data distribution, this
tends to have a negative impact on data quality. For example,
enforcing local k-anonymity can lead to more information loss
than enforcing global k-anonymity. If data is distributed vertically,
the integration of the locally anonymous datasets can result in
global non-anonymous datasets. If, e.g., new columns are added
to a k-anonymized dataset, the result will in most cases not be
k-anonymous anymore. A workaround is to compute an anony-
mized version of one local dataset and send information about
the resulting equivalence classes (in terms of sets of tuple identiﬁ-
ers) to the other parties. These must then generalize their datasets
to such a degree that the integrated version maintains the initial
equivalence classes.
Virtual anonymization is implemented by constructing a Secure
Multiparty Computing (SMC) protocol which exposes only anony-
mized data to all parties. The basic idea of SMC is that n parties,
each of with deﬁnes an input xi with 1 6 i 6 n, compute a function
f ðx1; x2; . . . xnÞ in such a way that each party only gets to know its
own input and the result. In general, this approach is computation-
ally more complex than the others but guarantees to preserve the
privacy of all subjects.
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The SMC paradigm can be based upon three different scenarios
[39]. We quickly covered the scenario involving a trusted third
party in the previous section and found that it is not applicable
in our context. The semi-honestmodel is a common scenario, which
is sometimes also called honest-but-curious. Here it is assumed that
all parties adhere to the protocol but try to extract additional infor-
mation from temporary results and their own input. The model
only covers attackers that participate in the computation (insiders).
On the other hand of the spectrum, the malicious model deﬁnes no
restrictions for participants.
3.3. Commutative encryption
SMC protocols are often implemented with commutative
encryption. The basic idea is to encrypt data in an order-indepen-
dent manner, i.e., the order of consecutive encryption and
decryption operations with different cryptographic keys does not
affect the result. Let E1ðxÞ; . . . ; EnðxÞ be a set of encryption functions
and D1ðxÞ; . . . ;DnðxÞ be a set of associated decryption functions, i.e.,
DiðEiðxÞÞ ¼ x for all 1 6 i 6 n. The functions are commutative if
EiðEjðxÞÞ ¼ EjðEiðxÞÞ for all 1 6 i; j 6 n. It follows that
DiðEiðEjðxÞÞÞ ¼ DiðEjðEiðxÞÞÞ ¼ EjðxÞ, i.e., arbitrary permutations of a
set of cryptographic operations yield the same result. In this work,
we use a deterministic encryption algorithm, which means that the
same plaintext always results in the same ciphertext.
3.4. Distributed anonymization algorithms
Several methods for anonymizing distributed data have been
proposed in the literature. In this section we focus on approaches
that implement the virtual anonymization methodology.
An algorithm-independent approach for k-anonymizing verti-
cally distributed data with a secure set intersection method has
been described in [40]. The protocol starts with all parties commu-
tatively encrypting the common tuple identiﬁers. Each party itera-
tively transforms its local data subset and builds sets of common
tuple identiﬁers that fall into one group. The sets of identiﬁers from
all parties are then intersected. A transformation is globally anon-
ymous when all intersections contain at least k common tuple
identiﬁers. For secure set intersection, the authors use a protocol
based on probabilistic homomorphic encryption [41].
Mohammed et al. propose a distributed implementation of Top-
Down Specialization to k-anonymize vertically distributed datasets
[42]. The algorithm starts with a maximally generalized dataset. In
each step, one party is selected that specializes its attributes in the
global dataset as far as the dataset remains anonymous. This
specialized dataset is then passed to the next party, which again
specializes its attributes. The process halts when no further spe-
cialization is possible without violating the privacy criterion. As a
result, the protocol only exchanges anonymized versions of a
dataset. The party which is to anonymize its subset in each step
is selected greedily based on a heuristic score that measures infor-
mation loss by means of a dataset’s entropy. The optimal party for
each iteration is determined by distributing the dataset to all par-
ties and selecting the party whose transformation results in the
minimal score.
The work from [42] was extended for horizontally distributed
health data in [30]. In this variant, the parties select a supervisor
that collects a representative tuple and the sizes from all groups
of quasi-identiﬁers, so called count statistics, from all parties. This
allows to globally evaluate the anonymity criterion by matching
the tuples and accumulating the counts with the secure summa-
tion protocol proposed in [43]. Analogously to the vertical scenario,
the solution space is traversed with a greedy heuristic.In [38] a distributed implementation of Mondrian for the hori-
zontal setup is presented. It implements the same algorithm with
secure primitives, i.e., privacy-preserving summation, minimum,
maximum and median operators. The secure minimum and maxi-
mum protocol enables a master party to guide the anonymization
process, while the secure median operator is used to distribute
information about the next generalization. The privacy criterion
is evaluated using the secure summation protocol.
In [44] a distributed implementation of the Sequential Clustering
Algorithm is presented. The approach uses SMC primitives: secure
summation and secure logical and. To calculate the number of
elements in a given cluster and for measuring the induced informa-
tion loss the approach uses the summation protocol. To generalize
a distributed cluster, the secure protocol for the logical and opera-
tor is utilized.
Zhong et al. proposed a protocol for extracting a k-anonymous
subset out of distributed datasets [45]. As the approach is not gen-
eralization-based and only extracts a subset of the data, we do not
further consider it in this work.4. Methods
In this section we present our novel method for computing an
anonymized and integrated dataset. We ﬁrst describe our protocol,
followed by examples for vertically and horizontally distributed
data to clarify the approach. A description of implementation de-
tails, followed by a model of the protocol closes the section.
4.1. Prerequisites and assumptions
As our method is based on generalization hierarchies, we as-
sume that such hierarchies have been constructed prior to its
execution. In case of continuous variables, hierarchies can also be
expressed as functions that are executed on the local data subsets.
These functions must be designed in a way that the rules generated
for equal values are consistent amongst the different subsets. An
example would be to incrementally reduce the precision of
numeric values in the range ½0;1 by one digit. For the sake of clar-
ity, we use discrete variables in our examples and assume that the
generalization hierarchies have been materialized prior to execut-
ing our protocol. We assume that all hierarchies are known by all
parties prior to the anonymization process. In practice, the integra-
tion of distributed data will most likely lead to consistency
problems. We assume that data integration and cleanup has hap-
pened before starting the protocol and that no consistency prob-
lems remain. We assume that the relationships between tuples
in vertical subsets are represented by a common tuple identiﬁer
(TID) and that horizontal subsets do not overlap. Similar to most
approaches, we assume a semi-honest security model and the exis-
tence of secure communication channels (e.g., SSL/TLS connections
with certiﬁcates) to protect the protocol against external attackers.
Moreover, we assume a multi-way negotiation of cryptographic
algorithms and parameters prior to the execution of the protocol.
This includes the deterministic and commutative encryption algo-
rithm and its parameters, such as key and block sizes. Finally, we
assume that each party has generated a set of random keys, one
for each of its attributes. We will present a discussion of the pre-
requisites in Section 6.5 and outline extensions of our approach
that relax these assumptions.
4.2. Overview
When anonymizing data, four different types of attributes are
typically distinguished. Obviously identifying attributes (e.g.,
names) are removed from the dataset. This is done by the
Fig. 3. Three parties p1;p2;p3 and their data d1;d2;d3.
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attributes are generalized, while sensitive attributes are preserved
as-is and it is made sure that they fulﬁll privacy criteria such as
‘-diversity or t-closeness. Insensitive attributes pose no privacy
threat and they are thus preserved as-is. For the sake of simplicity,
we handle insensitive attributes analogously to quasi-identifying
and sensitive attributes in our protocol.
The basic idea of our method is to encrypt quasi-identifying and
sensitive attributes in a way that allows performing anonymiza-
tion processes on the encrypted representation. To this end, ﬁrstly,
an encrypted global view of the dataset and the generalization
hierarchies is constructed. The cryptographic functions are deter-
ministic, meaning that the same plaintext always results in the
same ciphertext. Secondly, an anonymization algorithm is applied
to the encrypted representation of the dataset using the encrypted
generalization hierarchies. This is possible, because the same cryp-
tographic operations are applied to the dataset and the generaliza-
tion hierarchies. Finally, the anonymized encrypted dataset is
decrypted, yielding an integrated and anonymized representation
of the input datasets.
The integration phase is different for the horizontal and vertical
scenario. In the horizontal setup, permutation is employed to pre-
vent privacy threats and duplicate generalization rules must be re-
moved. In the vertical scenario, the encrypted dataset is sorted by
the tuple identiﬁers, which are then removed.Pr
e
Po
st
Encryption (R-PRR)
Anonymization
Decryption (R-SRR)
Integration (L-SRR)
R-PRR = Right-parallel round robin
L/R-SRR = Left/Right- sequential round robin
Fig. 4. Anonymizing distributed data.4.3. Protocol
In our method, the parties are ordered in a closed circle, i.e., the
right neighbor of pi is deﬁned as p1þði mod nÞ. The data subset main-
tained by pi is denoted by di. An example setup with three parties is
shown in Fig. 3. Our protocol implements two different types of
communication patterns, which we call sequential round robin
(SRR) and parallel round robin (PRR). As can be seen in Fig. 3, one
party, e.g., p1, initiates an SRR phase by sending a data packet,
e.g., d1, to its right (R-SRR) or left (L-SRR) neighbor. This party pro-
cesses the packet and passes it onto its right or left neighbor. The
process halts after n 1 steps, when the neighbor of the initiating
party receives the data packet. In contrast, a PRR is initiated simul-
taneously by all parties and each packet is passed along the circle
until the neighbor of the originating party received and processed
the packet. For example, p3 ﬁrst processes its own data (d3), then
receives and processes the data from p2, and ﬁnally the data from
p1.
When compared to each other, PRR phases are more efﬁcient
that SRR phases because they are parallelized. Synchronization
points are only required at the end of each phase, where the parties
have to wait until all messages have been processed by all parties.
L-PRR and R-PRR as well as L-SRR and R-SRR respectively are only
different in the direction in which the data is passed through the
ring. This distinguishing is necessary, because encryption and inte-
gration have to be implemented with opposite directions. One ofthe parties acts as a master which receives and anonymizes the
integrated view of the dataset.
Before the encryption phase, each party extracts the relevant
subsets of the global generalization hierarchies according to the lo-
cal domain of each of its quasi-identiﬁers. As a result, the local
hierarchies only reﬂect generalization rules for the values con-
tained in the local data subset. The preprocessing phase of our
protocol, where an encrypted global dataset is constructed, can
be divided into two sub-phases. During the ﬁrst sub-phase
(encryption) all local data subsets and corresponding generalization
hierarchies are commutatively encrypted by all parties in a right-
parallel round robin phase. As is shown in Fig. 4, the preprocessing
phase ends with an integration phase where in a left-sequential
round robin manner the local data subsets and hierarchies of each
party are integrated (integration). As the generalization hierarchies
are encrypted analogously to the data, the resulting rules can be
applied to the encrypted dataset which can thus be anonymized
during the anonymization phase. The postprocessing phase consists
of decrypting the anonymized dataset by all parties in a sequential
round robin phase (decryption).4.3.1. Encryption
First, a R-PRR phase is utilized to commutatively and determin-
istically encrypt all data by all parties. Each party uses its keys to
encrypt its data subset. The hierarchies are encrypted analogously,
utilizing the key assigned to the attribute to which the hierarchy is
to be applied. As the encryption function is deterministic, the same
plaintext always results in the same ciphertext. As each column is
encrypted with a different key, the same plaintexts from different
columns result in different ciphertexts. Each party then sends all
data to its right neighbor, which applies the same process.
The encryption phase halts, when each party holds a version of
the data from its left neighbor that has been commutatively en-
crypted by all parties. In case of vertical data distribution, the par-
ties now sort the data subsets according to the lexicographical
order induced by the encrypted tuple identiﬁers. These identiﬁers
can now be removed, as the order of the data items is sufﬁcient to
integrate the different subsets.4.3.2. Integration
The integration phase is initiated by the left neighbor of the
master party, e.g., p3. It implements a sequential round robin phase
in the opposite direction of the encryption phase. P3 sends the fully
encrypted data from p1 back to its left neighbor, p2, which inte-
grates the data with the fully encrypted data from p3, and sends
it to p1, which again integrates it with its fully encrypted data from
p2. In case of vertical data distribution, the subsets are integrated
by concatenating the columns and in case of horizontal data distri-
bution, the subsets are integrated by concatenating the rows. In the
latter scenario, generalization hierarchies for the same attributes
from different parties must also be merged. In this context, dupli-
cate rules must be eliminated, which result if two or more parties
Fig. 5. Integrating horizontally distributed data.
Fig. 6. Distribution of example data amongst three parties.
Fig. 7. Encrypted data held by p2.
F. Kohlmayer et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 62–76 67share the same data item and thus included the same generaliza-
tion rule into their local hierarchies. Conﬂicts cannot occur, as hier-
archies are deﬁned globally (cf. Section 6.5). The process halts
when the master party receives an encrypted global view of the
dataset together with the encrypted generalization hierarchies.
4.3.3. Anonymization
In this phase the integrated and encrypted dataset is anony-
mized using a centralized anonymization algorithm and the en-
crypted generalization hierarchies. This is possible, because the
generalization process is only a substitution of values with more
generalized ones. As the semantic information is hidden in the en-
crypted generalization hierarchies, there is no need to know the
plaintext values. Many of the previously presented algorithms
and criteria are supported. More details will be given in Sections
6.2 and 6.3. The phase results in an encrypted anonymous dataset.
4.3.4. Decryption
During the postprocessing phase the anonymous encrypted
dataset is decrypted in a sequential round robin phase initiated
by the master party. To this end, the party decrypts the dataset
with its private set of keys and sends it to its right neighbor. This
process is repeated until the left neighbor of the master receives
an unencrypted anonymized version of the global dataset.
4.3.5. Random permutation
Similar to other approaches, e.g., [38,44], our protocol relaxes
the privacy guarantees of traditional multi-party computations,
where no information, except the result can be obtained by partic-
ipants. Additional information is of course only available to the
parties executing the protocol, and not to external entities. In our
protocol, the parties process non-anonymized data subsets that
are encrypted by some or all parties. As the data are encrypted
deterministically on a cell level, the parties could extract statistical
patterns from these representations. These patterns could be used
to identify the subset of the integrated data that has been contrib-
uted by the party, which potentially allows to infer information
about data from the other participants. To prevent this, each party
shufﬂes the rows of the processed data subset randomly before
sending it to the next party during the encryption phase. As a re-
sult, information about the order of the data items is removed
and the construction of patterns is prevented. A collection of data
distributions is still possible and these could be used for frequency
attacks. See Section 6.1 for a more detailed discussion and
countermeasures.
The protocol is designed in a way in which the master party is
the only party that ever receives a fully encrypted version of its
own data. At this point the master party’s data has been randomly
merged with as many other subsets as possible (n 2), as can be
seen from the example in Fig. 5. P3 sends the encrypted data from
p1 to p2, which randomly merges (i.e., merges and permutes) these
data with the data from p3 and sends it to p1. When p1 receives its
own subset it has thus been randomly merged with the data from
p3. Analogously to the encryption process, data is randomly per-
muted during the decryption phase to prevent the mapping of local
subsets to the anonymized global view.4.4. Examples
Each party maintains one key for each attribute. We denote the
TID with 1 and order the attributes according to their position in
Fig. 1, i.e., Gender = 2, Age = 3 and ZIP = 4. For example, E23ð45Þ de-
notes that p2 encrypts age 45 with its respective key for attribute
number 3.4.4.1. Vertical distribution
In the following section, we present an example that anonymiz-
es a vertically distributed version of the data from Fig. 2. As is
shown in Fig. 6, we assume three parties, from which p1 stores
the attribute ZIP, p2 stores the attribute Age and p3 stores the attri-
bute Gender. Hierarchies for the example data are sketched in
Fig. 1. The hierarchy for Gender is held by p3 and the hierarchy
for ZIP is held by p1. We focus on one party, p2, in the remainder
of this section.
Firstly, p2 generates random keys for each of the columns and
commutatively encrypts the tuple identiﬁers and the payload.
The result is shown in Fig. 7. Now the data is permuted randomly
and sent to the right neighbor, p3 in our example. Analogously, p2
receives the encrypted data from p1. It encrypts the data, randomly
permutes it and sends it to p3.
Secondly, when the encryption phase has terminated, the left
neighbor of the master, p3 in our example, starts the integration
process. It sorts the data from p1 according to the encrypted TIDs,
removes them and sends the data to p2, which applies the same
process and merges the subsets. This process is sketched in
Fig. 8. As a result, p1 receives a global view of the encrypted data-
set. As is shown for the sake of clarity, all values in one column
have been encrypted by the parties in the same order, but the
orderings differ between columns.
Thirdly, p1 enforces a privacy criterion. In our example we as-
sume 2-anonymity, as is shown in Fig. 9. During the anonymization
process p1 ﬁnds the optimal solution by replacing the encrypted
values for Agewith the values of the encrypted generalization hier-
archy on level one and by replacing the values for ZIP with the cor-
responding values on level three. The attribute Gender can be left
ungeneralized.
Finally, after the decryption phase, which is initiated by p1; p3
holds an unencrypted anonymized version of the global dataset.
The result equals the data that would have resulted from
Fig. 8. Integrating the global encrypted dataset.
Fig. 9. 2-anonymized encrypted dataset.
Fig. 11. Hierarchies for the horizontal subset of p1.
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Fig. 1 in Section 2.2.Fig. 12. Encrypted data subset from p1.
Fig. 13. Global encrypted dataset.4.4.2. Horizontal distribution
In the following section, we present an example that anonymiz-
es a horizontally distributed version of the data from Fig. 6 in Sec-
tion 2.2. As is shown in Fig. 10, we again assume three parties, from
which p1 and p2 store three tuples while p3 stores two tuples.
The set of relevant local generalization rules extracted from the
global generalization hierarchies for the data subset of p1 are
shown in Fig. 11.
Each party again generates a set of random keys and encrypts
all columns and generalization hierarchies with the associated
keys. The encrypted subset from party p1 in our example is shown
in Fig. 12.
Next, the resulting data is sent to the right neighbor. p1 sends its
data to p2, which encrypts it with its own set of secret keys and
sends it to p3. When p3 receives the data originating from p1 it en-
crypts and permutes it and sends it back to p2. P2 randomly com-
bines the data from p3 with its own data and sends it to p1
which again randomly combines it with its own data. p1 now holds
a global view of the encrypted dataset, as is shown in Fig. 13. In
contrast to the vertical scenario, the order in which values have
been encrypted is now different within each column but consistent
within each row. Note that this difference is only emphasized for
the sake of clarity and is not relevant when executing the protocol
due to the use of commutative encryption.
The encrypted global generalization hierarchies are an integra-
tion of local generalization hierarchies. As can be seen from the
example in Fig. 14 the order of which values have been encrypted
is different between rows but consistent within each row. This is
due to the fact that the individual generalization rules originate
from different local hierarchies. In our example, the ﬁrst rule is
from the local hierarchy of p1 and the second rule from p2.Fig. 10. Exemplary horizoAnonymization and decryption are applied analogously to the
vertical scenario and yield the same result as anonymizing the data
at a trusted third party.
4.5. Implementation details
For evaluating our approach, we developed a prototype based
on the Java platform. For data exchange, we employ dictionary
compression and represent all data as two-dimensional arrays of
structural information and associated dictionaries. As is shown in
Fig. 15, each dictionary contains a set of values that can be refer-
enced by means of row indexes.
In our method the same set of keys will be used for encrypting
several plaintexts. When choosing a commutative encryption algo-
rithm, it is therefore important to make sure that the method is not
vulnerable in such a scenario. For example, using a simple XOR ci-
pher would be unsafe, as (part of) the key could be reconstructedntal data distribution.
Fig. 14. Global encrypted hierarchy for Gender.
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Fig. 16. Implemented protocol.
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ments for an encryption algorithm are the same as in [46].
In our prototype we use a variant of the Pohlig–Hellman Cipher
(see Section 16.2 in [47]). Instead of its classic implementation
based on modular exponentiation, we use a variant based on
multiplications on elliptic curves. The advantage of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) is that it requires smaller bit lengths to achieve
security levels comparable to standard methods. We use the 192
bit elliptic curve prime192v1, which is standardized in ANSI
X9.62 [48], resulting in a key and block size of 192 bits. The
security level is comparable to 1536 bit RSA encryption but with
increased performance and reduced data volumes [49]. Crypto-
graphic operations are implemented with the GNU Multiple
Precision Arithmetic Library [50]. The encryption process is multi-
threaded and each thread handles a distinct set of data items.
We make sure that all values have a constant plaintext length,
which allows to encrypt a data item with only one application of
ECC-Pohlig–Hellmann. To this end, each party maintains a secret
dictionary that maps its data items to 160 bit SHA-1 hash values.
The encoding of plaintext data items as hash values is performed
transparently during the encryption phase. For decoding the data,
we implement an additional sequential phase in which each party
replaces the hash values with the actual data items. The protocol
implemented by our prototype is shown in Fig. 16.4.6. Modeling the protocol
In this section, we present means to estimate the execution
times and the exchanged data volumes for our algorithms. The
overall execution times are dominated by the time needed for
cryptographic operations and data exchange, which are thus the
only operations considered in our model. We denote the number
of parties with n, the number of rows in the global dataset with r
and the number of columns with c. The total number of distinct
values in the global dataset is denoted with d. We assume a homo-
geneous setup in which each machine can execute a commutative
cryptographic operation in time Mc and the machines can commu-
nicate with a bandwidth of Mb. Commutatively encrypted values
are assumed to have a bit length of Lc. The global dataset can be
represented by an array of size c  r for structural information
and a dictionary of size d for data elements. Each element in the
structural array is assumed to have a bit length of La. For the scope
of this article, we assume equal data distribution in our analysis. In
the horizontal case each party holds the same number of rows rn,
columns c and distinct values d, extracted from the global dataset.
In the vertical setup, we assume that each party has the same num-
ber of columns cn, rows r and that the distinct values of the global
dataset are equally distributed, i.e. each party has dn distinct values.
The formulas can be extended to cover heterogeneous setups and
unequal data distributions.Fig. 15. Dictionary compres4.6.1. Cryptographic operations
During the encryption phase, the workload is parallelized
amongst all parties. The execution time is therefore determined
by the workload for one party. In case of vertical data distribution,
each party holds r distinct tuple identiﬁers and dn distinct data
items. Each party must encrypt the data from all parties, resulting
in a total of ev ¼ n  ðr þ dnÞ commutative encryptions. In case of hor-
izontal data distribution, each party performs eh ¼ n  d commuta-
tive encryptions. As the data is already integrated in the decryption
phase, there is no difference for horizontal or vertical distribution.
Decryption is a sequential phase in which each party must decrypt
all data items, i.e., dvh ¼ n  d. In summary, the execution time for
cryptographic operations can be estimated with
tcv ¼ ðev þ dvhÞ Mc in the vertical setup and tch ¼ ðeh þ dvhÞ Mc in
the horizontal setup.
4.6.2. Exchanged data volumes
The number of messages exchanged in each of the four phases
can be calculated based on the communication pattern, which is
independent of data distribution. During phase one, each data sub-
set is sent to n 1 parties, resulting in f 1v ¼ f 1h ¼ n  ðn 1Þmessage
exchanges. In the second phase the data subsets are integrated
iteratively, which we model as one message being sent n 1 times,
another message being sent n 2 times and so on. This results in
f 2v ¼ f 2h ¼ n ðn1Þ2 message exchanges. During phases three and four,
each message is sent f 34v ¼ f 34h ¼ n 1 times, as each message is
sent to all parties apart from the originator.
In the ﬁrst phase of the vertical scenario, each party holds a data
subset of size s1v ¼ ðcn þ 1Þ  r  La þ ðdn þ rÞ  Lc , as each party is
assumed to hold cn columns and an additional column with tuple
identiﬁers and dn distinct attribute values plus r tuple identiﬁers.
The data held by each party in the second phase equals the data
from the ﬁrst phase without tuple identiﬁers, i.e.,
s2v ¼ cn  r  La þ dn  Lc . In the ﬁrst and second phase of the horizontal
scenario each party holds a data subset of size
s12h ¼ rn  c  La þ d  Lc , as each party is assumed to hold d distinct val-
ues. In the third and fourth phase, each message contains a repre-
sentation of the global dictionary compressed dataset, regardless of
data distribution. This can be estimated with
s34v ¼ s34h ¼ c  r  La þ d  Lc .sed dataset from Fig. 2.
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estimated with dv ¼ f 1v  s1v þ f 2v  s2v þ 2  f 34v  s34v , while the data vol-
ume in the horizontal scenario can be estimated with
dh ¼ f 1h  s12h þ f 2h  s12h þ 2  f 34h  s34h . The time needed for data transfer
can thus be estimated by tdh ¼ dh Mb and tdv ¼ dv Mb respectively.5. Results
For our evaluation we used ﬁve real-world datasets, most of
which have already been utilized for assessing previous work on
data anonymization. The datasets include the an excerpt of the
1994 US census database (ADULT), KDD Cup 1998 data (CUP),
NHTSA crash statistics (FARS), the American Time Use Survey
(ATUS) and the Integrated Health Interview Series (IHIS). The
ADULT dataset serves as a de facto standard for the evaluation of
anonymization algorithms. An overview over the datasets is shown
in Table 1. They cover a wide spectrum, ranging from about 30 k to
1.2 M rows (2.52 MB to 107.56 MB) consisting of eight or nine qua-
si-identiﬁers, from which we also chose a sensitive attribute. The
associated generalization hierarchies feature between two and
six levels, resulting in search spaces between 12,960 (ADULT)
and 45,000 (CUP) transformations.5.1. Analytical evaluation
In this section, we present estimates for our testbed, which can
execute roughly Mc ¼ 3000 cryptographic operations per second.
The network provides a net bandwidth of Mb ¼ 88;000;000 bit/s
(Fast Ethernet). Each entry of the structural array requires
La ¼ 32 bits. The encrypted values have a size of Lc ¼ 192 bits.
We compare these estimates with execution times for applying
common privacy criteria, which were obtained with the ARX
Anonymization Framework [51] that implements the optimal data
anonymization algorithm presented in [20]. As privacy criteria,
we chose 5-anonymity, recursive-(4,3)-diversity, 0.2-closeness
with hierarchical Earth-Mover’s-Distance and (0.05, 0.15)-pres-
ence of 10% random samples as research subsets. t-Closeness and
d-presence where combined with 5-anonymity. We decided to in-
clude numbers for an optimal anonymization algorithm, as this
shows the ability of our approach to efﬁciently implement such
algorithms in a distributed setting. We also chose a broad spec-
trum of privacy criteria to demonstrate the ﬂexibility of our ap-
proach. We set k ¼ 5 as this represents a rough upper bound, i.e.,
the execution times will decrease with increasing values, and the
parameter is typically used in the healthcare domain. All anonymi-
zations were performed with a 3% suppression rate, which is again
a typical parameter.
Table 2 shows estimated execution times for our protocol with
two (2P) or three parties (3P). Note that the estimates only depend
on the number of parties and basic statistics about the dataset. It
can be seen that, in case of vertical distribution, the execution
times of the pre- and postprocessing phase are about oneTable 1
Evaluation datasets.
Dataset Columns (c) Rows (r) Distinct (d) Size [MB]
ADULTa 9 30,162 166 2.52
CUPb 8 63,441 14,407 7.11
FARSc 8 100,937 238 7.19
ATUSd 9 539,253 305 84.03
IHISe 9 1,193,504 186 107.56
a http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult.
b http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup98/kddcup98.html.
c http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/main/index.aspx.
d http://atusdata.org/index.shtml.
e http://www.ihis.us/.magnitude higher than the execution times of the anonymization
phase. It can also be seen that the execution times for two parties
are lower than the execution times for three parties. This is due to
the fact that in this case the costs are dominated by the number of
tuple identiﬁers, which grows linearly with the number of parties.
For the different datasets the execution times increase linearly
with the number of rows. In case of horizontal data distribution,
the execution times of the pre- and postprocessing phase are
roughly equivalent to the anonymization phase. Here, the com-
plexity of the former phase is dominated by the number of distinct
values in the dataset. This is also represented in the execution
times for the CUP dataset, where, due to the large number of
distinct values, the pre- and postprocessing phase is about one
magnitude slower than the anonymization phase. Generally, our
method adds a notable overhead in case of vertical distribution
and an almost negligible overhead in case of horizontal
distribution.
5.2. Experimental evaluation
Our testbed consisted of three desktop machines, each of which
was equipped with a quad-core 3.1 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU running
a 64-bit Linux 3.2.0 kernel and a 64-bit Sun JVM (1.7.0). The ma-
chines were connected with a Fast Ethernet switch (100 Mbit/s).
5.2.1. Execution times
Fig. 17 shows the summarized execution times for pre- and
postprocessing all datasets with two (2P) and three parties (3P).
It can be seen that the estimates from the previous section closely
resemble actual execution times. In 13 out of 20 cases our esti-
mates are off by only 1–2 s. In four cases they are of by 5–10 s
and in three cases they are off by 20–50 s. The latter three cases
correspond to overall times of 10 to 20 min.
In the vertical scenario, the execution times range from 21 s
(ADULT) to 13.2 min (IHIS) with two parties. With three parties
the execution times increase by roughly a factor of 1.5, i.e., 31 s
for the ADULT dataset and 19.8 min for IHIS. When datasets have
a constant number of distinct data values, the execution times
scale linearly with the number of rows, as the tuple identiﬁers in
each subset deﬁne the cryptographic overhead. As the CUP dataset
contains signiﬁcantly more distinct data items than the other data-
sets it stands out.
In the horizontal scenario, performance increases signiﬁcantly.
Here, execution times are much more strongly inﬂuenced by the
total number of distinct data values per dataset. As a result the
CUP dataset, which has the highest number of distinct data items,
and the IHIS dataset, which has the highest number of rows, re-
quire almost the same processing time. When datasets have a con-
stant number of distinct data items, the overall execution times are
dominated by exchanging data over the network. The total execu-
tion time ranges from 1 s for the ADULT dataset with two parties to
30 s for the CUP dataset with three parties. The differences
between executing the protocol with two or three parties range be-
tween a factor of 2.0 for ADULT and 0.73 for the CUP dataset.
Fig. 18 shows how these execution times are distributed
amongst the four phases of the protocol. In the vertical scenario,
times are dominated by the encryption phase, where n columns
with unique tuple identiﬁers have to be encrypted in parallel n
times (between 84% for CUP and roughly 98% for the other data-
sets). In the horizontal scenario, times are less inﬂuenced by cryp-
tographic operations but by data exchange. As a result, integration,
decryption and decoding contribute a signiﬁcant share of the over-
all times. The CUP dataset is the only exception, because it contains
the most distinct values which increases the cryptographic
workload. When comparing the execution with two parties to
the execution with three parties, there is a slight decrease in the
Table 2
Estimated times for pre- and postprocessing [s] vs. measured times for anonymization [s].
Dataset 2P – vertical 3P – vertical 2P – horizontal 3P – horizontal k-Anonymity ‘-Diversity t-Closeness d-Presence
ADULT 21 32 1 1 1 1 1 1
CUP 58 85 20 31 1 3 6 1
FARS 69 105 1 3 3 3 3 1
ATUS 369 560 7 13 41 25 18 3
IHIS 816 1239 14 28 92 119 101 39
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
P2 P3 P2 P3 P2 P3 P2 P3 P2 P3
Ex
ec
u
tio
n 
tim
es
 [s
]
21 31 64
95 68 103
361
540
787
1190
IHISATUSFARSCUPADULT
(a) Vertical distribution
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
P2 P3 P2 P3 P2 P3 P2 P3 P2 P3
1 2
22
30
2 3
9
14
18
29
IHISATUSFARSCUPADULT
(b) Horizontal distribution
Fig. 17. Absolute execution times for different data distributions.
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Fig. 18. Relative execution times for different data distributions.
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times. The reason is that the exchanged data volumes increase
with the number of parties.
5.2.2. Exchanged data volumes
Fig. 19 depicts the total transferred data volumes for all conﬁg-
urations. It can be seen that data volumes range from 4 MB for the
ADULT dataset with two parties in the horizontal scenario to
690 MB for the IHIS dataset with three parties in the vertical setup.
Data volumes in the vertical scenario are roughly two times the
volumes from the horizontal scenario. This is not directly related
to the overall performance, as the execution times of the vertical
scenario are dominated by cryptographic operations, whereas the
execution times of the horizontal scenario are dominated by data
exchange. In the vertical setup, most data is exchanged during
the encryption phase, because packet volumes are mostly deter-
mined by the number of tuple identiﬁers. These are dropped before
the integration phase. In the horizontal setup, the data volumes of
the encryption, integration and decoding phases are roughly equiv-
alent. This shows that they are dominated by the structural arrays,
as dictionary compression is differently efﬁcient in these three
phases due to data distribution.
5.2.3. Information loss
In this section, we compare the information loss of our ap-
proach with two baseline techniques: anonymize-and-integrate
of horizontally and vertically distributed data. Again, we use anoptimal anonymization algorithm with global recoding and tuple
suppression as an example. In the horizontal case, the local data
subsets are anonymized and then integrated into a global dataset
[30]. In the vertical scenario, one local dataset is anonymized and
the others are generalized to such a degree that an integrated ver-
sion maintains the initial equivalence classes (see Section 3.1).
Both techniques are an interesting baseline, as they are straightfor-
ward methods for privacy-preserving anonymization of distributed
data. Regarding data distribution, we use the same conﬁgurations
as in the previous sections. We restrict the comparison to k-ano-
nymity and l-diversity, as t-closeness and d-presence cannot easily
be implemented with these approaches.
The results are given in Table 3. It shows the information loss of
our approach relative to the information loss of the baseline tech-
niques. Information loss was measured with the non-uniform
entropy metric [14]. As can be seen, our approach enables a signif-
icant and consistent increase in data quality, with loss of informa-
tion being reduced by up to 87% (for k-anonymizing the vertically
distributed CUP dataset with three parties). Two trends are obvi-
ous. First, the decrease in information loss enabled by our approach
is stronger in 85% of cases when comparing the vertical scenario to
the horizontal scenario. Second, the decrease in information loss
enabled by our approach is stronger in 75% of cases when compar-
ing the setups with three parties to the setups with two parties.
Note that in the horizontal scenario, the baseline technique imple-
ments local recoding, as different generalization strategies can be
applied to different horizontal subsets.
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Fig. 19. Data exchanged for different data distributions.
Table 3
Information loss of a globally optimal algorithm compared to baseline techniques [%].
Dataset k-Anonymity ‘-Diversity
2P – vertical 3P – vertical 2P – horizontal 3P – horizontal 2P – vertical 3P – vertical 2P – horizontal 3P – horizontal
ADULT 50 45 92 97 76 65 70 68
CUP 15 13 43 32 87 70 65 55
FARS 62 60 89 98 79 79 89 85
ATUS 40 39 79 85 64 65 82 92
IHIS 25 22 67 56 42 35 69 63
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We will ﬁrst discuss threats and countermeasures, describing
how our approach implements a trade-off between privacy, data
quality and efﬁciency. We will then present a comparison with
previous work and justify the preconditions for and assumptions
of our method.
6.1. Threats and countermeasures
Our approach relaxes the privacy guarantees of traditional SMC
protocols. In this section we discuss to which extent the additional
information leaked by our protocol could be used by participants
to compromise the privacy of other parties. We then present coun-
termeasures to mitigate these threats.
An obvious threat results from parties re-identifying their own
encrypted contribution to the overall dataset. This allows learning
the ciphertext for known plaintext values. In case of horizontal dis-
tribution, this knowledge could be used to decode values from
other parties during the integration phase, if they share a common
attribute value. In case of vertical distribution, the re-identiﬁcation
of own tuples could be used to infer additional information by
knowing which other (encrypted) vertical subsets of tuples are
associated.
Two countermeasures exist against this threat. First, the permu-
tation of tuples as described in Section 4.3.5 prevents the construc-
tion of detailed patterns that contain information about the order
of data items. Second, the associated scheme for merging the data-
sets makes sure that only the master party is able to see an en-
crypted version of its own data. If this is not deemed sufﬁcient,
an additional party that does not hold or encrypt any data itself
can replace the master and integrate and anonymize the data. This
completely prevents this threat.
A remaining threat comes from frequency attacks, a susceptibil-
ity to which lies in the nature of deterministic (not semantically se-
cure) encryption schemes necessary for our approach. Here, an
attacker could try to guess the values of an attribute and their dis-
tribution and match these with the distribution of the encrypted
values. Again, this potentially allows the decryption of encrypted
attribute values. The susceptibility of individual attributes to thisattack depends on their characteristics, e.g., distribution in the
dataset and availability of knowledge about their distribution in
speciﬁc populations. An in-depth study of frequency attacks is
out of the scope of this work, but they have extensively been stud-
ied in literature on order-preserving encryption schemes, e.g.,
[52,53].
Two countermeasures exist against frequency attacks. First,
they can to some extent be mitigated by employing pregeneraliza-
tion. Second, a very widespread countermeasure consists of Data
Use Agreements (DUAs). They are a common measure before ac-
cess to restricted data is granted, and their use is essential for HIP-
AAs limited dataset [54]. Often they are combined with partial
anonymization. DUAs are contracts deﬁning rights and duties,
and they are typically used when complete anonymity would re-
strict data quality in an unacceptable way.
Pregeneralization can be applied as a technical measure for
attributes which have a high risk of being susceptible to frequency
attacks. This means that attributes in local datasets are pregeneral-
ized before the anonymization process, which coarsens their distri-
butions and thus makes frequency attacks more difﬁcult. When
implementing globally optimal algorithms, as in our example, it
can be seen from the comparison with baseline techniques in the
previous section that the margins of pregeneralization that can
be applied while still yielding an increased data utility are often
very high. For these algorithms, pregeneralization leads to a new
search space, and it can simply be thought of as deﬁning minimal
generalization levels for the according attributes. It is important to
note that such algorithms still guarantee to ﬁnd an optimal solu-
tion within this new search space, but that this solution might re-
sult in higher information loss than without pregeneralization. Our
experiments showed that reducing the local datasets’ entropy, i.e.,
the number of distinct data values, can result in a signiﬁcant
speedup. Therefore, pregeneralization offers a trade-off between
privacy, data quality and efﬁciency.
The described threats become more severe when a malicious
security model is assumed. In this case, the master party could
provide manipulated data as input, which is speciﬁcally designed
to be susceptible to frequency attacks. The provision of manipu-
lated input data cannot be prevented in general and is also not
taken into account by other work on anonymizing distributed data
F. Kohlmayer et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 62–76 73in a malicious setting, e.g., [55]. Moreover, the master party could
skip the anonymization phase and return a non-anonymized ver-
sion of the dataset, which would then be decrypted. This could
be prevented by either distributing the encrypted dataset to all
parties and anonymizing them independently, or by introducing
multiple additional parties for this purpose. The results of these
independent anonymizations can then be compared to ensure cor-
rectness. The malicious scenario is highly unlikely, as in biomedical
research regulatory frameworks and contracts are employed to
prevent such situations. Moreover, the biomedical domain is very
aware of security problems and therefore state-of-the-art IT secu-
rity measures are generally applied to prevent external attackers
from compromising IT systems.
6.2. Supported algorithms
Although we used a globally optimal full-domain anonymiza-
tion algorithm in our examples, our method can be used to imple-
ment many algorithms. Most of the methods presented in
Section 2.1 are supported, but there are some restrictions that
we will discuss in this section.
Compatible algorithms need to be hierarchy-based or able to
build the required generalization structures out of the encrypted
data items. This is true for all algorithms from our overview, except
for Mondrian [24], as this is a partitioning-based algorithm that re-
quires a total-order on the data items. Unfortunately, such an order
cannot be provided for the encrypted data items resulting from our
method. The automatic building of generalization graphs in [27]
can be implemented with our method. Our approach also supports
all of the presented clustering algorithms, as these implement
distance metrics based on generalization hierarchies. When gener-
alizing data, some algorithms implement generalization-based
methods and partition-based methods for continuous attributes,
e.g., [15,23], from which only the former can be used in our meth-
od. If continuous variables are assumed to be quasi-identiﬁers,
generalization hierarchies must be provided (see Section 6.5).
The method presented in this article is the ﬁrst to enable efﬁ-
cient implementations of many algorithms in a distributed setting,
including heuristic algorithms, e.g., [23], clustering algorithms, e.g.,
[15], globally-optimal methods, e.g., [20] and domain-speciﬁc solu-
tions, e.g., [22].
6.3. Supported privacy criteria
Our approach supports most of the privacy criteria presented in
Section 2.2. The only limitation is that criteria must not require cal-
culations on the non-encrypted data items, e.g., computations of
differences between numerical values. A semantic comparison is
still possible by using information from generalization hierarchies.
For this reason, our method does not support privacy criteria
that are speciﬁcally targeted against numeric attributes. This in-
cludes t-closeness for numerical attributes, but all other variants
are supported. Analogously, ðk; eÞ-anonymity [34] and ð;mÞ-ano-
nymity [35] are not supported.
In its current form, our method does not support ‘-site-diver-
sity, as implementing it would require maintaining information
about which site contributed which data item. This countervails
our efforts to hide this information from the participants as dis-
cussed in Section 6.1.
ð; dÞk-Dissimilarity is a generic privacy principle that allows for
arbitrary distance metrics. The Variational Distance, which is used
as an example in the paper, can be implemented with our method.
To our knowledge, our approach is the ﬁrst to provide support
for such a broad spectrum of privacy criteria in a distributed setting.
In our prototype we implemented k-anonymity, recursive-ðc; lÞ-
diversity, t-closeness with hierarchical Earth-Mover’s-Distance aswell as d-presence with explicit world knowledge. Moreover, we
support the following criteria from Section 2.2: LKC-privacy,
ða; kÞ-anonymity, p-sensitive k-anonymity, ð; dÞk-dissimilarity
and m-invariance.
6.4. Comparison with previous work
In this section, we compare our approach with previous work
on distributed data anonymization. We discuss the algorithms pre-
sented in Section 3.4, which are distributed variants of the algo-
rithms presented in Section 2.1. In the following, we denote the
implementation of Distributed k-Anonymity from [40] with DkAv ,
the distributed implementation of Mondrian from [38] with Mon-
drianh, the implementation of Top Down Specialization for vertically
distributed data from [42] with TDSv and the variant for horizon-
tally distributed data from [30] with TDSh and the distributed ver-
sion of the Sequential Clustering Algorithm from [44] with SCAhv .
Our work implements a mixture of all methods from the design
space. It employs the integrate-and-anonymize methodology, but
with encrypted data subsets. These are built by a SMC protocol
resembling the virtual anonymization method. The trade-off be-
tween privacy and data quality implements the anonymize-and-
integrate design alternative. In our evaluation, we have already
shown that our approach outperforms baseline techniques imple-
menting the anonymize-and-integrate method in terms of data
utility and ﬂexibility. Distributed data anonymization algorithms
provide support for different de-identiﬁcation methods, privacy
criteria and setups:
 Our approach supports an arbitrary number of parties. This is
true for all other approaches, apart from DkAv.
 Similar to DkAv and SCAhv our approach supports global and
local recoding, while Mondrianh, TDSh and TDSv only support
global recoding.
 DkAv, TDSh and TDSv provide perfect privacy, while our approach
and Mondrianh as well as SCAhv do not.
 Similar to SCAhv our method supports vertically and horizon-
tally distributed data. TDSh andMondrianh only support the hor-
izontal setup, while DkAv and TDSv only support the vertical
setup.
 The approaches also differ in the implemented privacy criteria.
DkAv is the only algorithm-independent competitor. In the
paper, the authors investigate only k-anonymity and as the
approach is based on intersecting equivalence classes using
tuple identiﬁers it is, e.g., not suitable for implementing cluster-
ing algorithms. The papers proposing TDSv and SCAhv provide
information on k-anonymity and ‘-diversity, while Mondrianh
implements k-anonymity and ‘-site-diversity and TDSh imple-
ments LKC-privacy, which implies support for k-anonymity
and ‘-diversity. To which degree other privacy criteria are sup-
ported by these approaches needs further investigations. Our
method supports a much broader spectrum of criteria as dis-
cussed in the previous section. In this paper, we have imple-
mented k-anonymity, ‘-diversity, t-closeness and d-presence.
In the remainder of this section, we compare the performance of
our approach to previous solutions. Note that our approach is not a
distributed data anonymization algorithm but a pre- and postpro-
cessing scheme. Although it enables the implementation of
centralized versions of anonymization algorithms in distributed
settings, this does not necessarily imply that such an implementa-
tion will be faster than a dedicated distributed variant, if such a
variant exists.
As no implementations of DkAv, Mondrianh, TDSv, TDSh or SCAhv
are available, we base our comparison on hardware-independent
measures or analytical models as for as possible. As a last resort,
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hardware, but only use those in a very conservative manner, taking
into account the increased performance of more modern hardware.
As many works lack a systematic experimental or analytical evalu-
ation, similar approaches have been taken in other articles, e.g.,
[42,30,44]. We exclude the approach fromMondrianh, as it presents
an implementation of the Mondrian algorithm [24], which is not
supported by our approach.
DkAv is algorithm-independent. As an example in their paper
[40], the authors use the Dataﬂy algorithm [21] for k-anonymizing
a vertically distributed version of the ADULT dataset with two
parties. The authors present a hardware-independent model for
estimating execution times that depends on the number of homo-
morphic cryptographic operations per second (COps/s). Our
testbed is able to perform 3000 commutative COps/s. We conserva-
tively assume 3000 homomorphic COps/s as well, although these
are generally slower that commutative operations. Under this
assumptions the approach requires about 5 days for k = 20, 6 days
for k = 50 and 8 days for k = 100. In contrast, our pre- and postpro-
cessing scheme requires 21 s. We benchmarked Dataﬂy on our
hardware and measured execution times of not more than 1 s for
this dataset with k = 20, 50 and 100. This shows that executing a
centralized version of Dataﬂy with our approach would signiﬁ-
cantly outperform DkAv.
TDSv was evaluated by k-anonymizing a vertically distributed
version of the ADULT dataset with two parties [42]. The authors
provide performance numbers for a testbed consisting of machines
with Intel Pentium IV 2.6 GHz CPUs and a FastEthernet LAN. The
authors state that their approach requires not more than 20 s for
20 6 k 6 50. Our pre- and postprocessing scheme requires 21 s
on more modern hardware. This indicates that executing the cen-
tralized version with our approach does not outperform TDSv for
20 6 k6 50. How the approach scales for smaller parameters, such
as the typically used value of k = 5 in the healthcare domain, needs
further investigation.
TDSh was evaluated by applying LKC-privacy to a horizontally
distributed version of the ADULT dataset with three parties [30].
The testbed consisted of machines with Intel Core2 Quad Q6600
2.4 GHz CPUs and a FastEthernet LAN. The authors indicate execu-
tion times of 30 s for L ¼ 4;20 6 K 6 100 and C ¼ 0:2. Our pre- and
postprocessing scheme requires 2 s on more modern hardware.
This indicates that using the centralized version of the algorithm
with our approach does not yield any signiﬁcant beneﬁts over
using the distributed variant.
SCAhv supports vertically and horizontally distributed data. We
base our evaluation on hardware-independent numbers about the
communication overhead and ignore the additional computations
performed by the approach. In [44], the authors report numbers
for k-anonymizing a vertically distributed version of the ADULT
dataset with two parties. For k = 100 their approach required
2880 s for data transfer in a FastEthernet LAN. This number is al-
most independent of k, it only slightly decreases for increasing
parameters. Our pre- and postprocessing scheme requires about
21 s (including computations) in an equivalent network environ-
ment, independent of the parameter k. The authors also report
numbers on a centralized implementation of their algorithm. For
the same dataset this version requires 150 s for k = 100 on older
hardware (Intel Core Duo T2350 CPU 1.86 GHz). As our scheme
and the centralized variant of the algorithm signiﬁcantly outper-
form the distributed implementation, this shows that implement-
ing the centralized version with our approach outperforms SCAhv.
The authors also report numbers for k-anonymizing a horizon-
tally distributed version of the ADULT dataset with two parties. For
k = 100 their approach required 800 s for data transfer in a FastEth-
ernet LAN. This number increases signiﬁcantly with decreasing k,
already requiring 4400 s for k = 25. Whether the approach is ableto handle smaller parameters, such as the typically used value of
k = 5 in the healthcare domain, needs further investigation. Our
pre- and postprocessing scheme requires about 1 s (including com-
putations) in an equivalent network environment, independent of
the parameter k. Again, assuming not more than 150 s are required
for executing the centralized variant, this shows that implement-
ing the centralized version with our approach outperforms SCAhv.
6.5. Discussion of prerequisites and assumptions
In this section, we discuss the assumptions of and prerequisites
for our approach, as outlined in Section 4.1.
Similar to other approaches, e.g., [40,38,42,30,44], we assume
that data integration and cleanup has happened before starting
the protocol. When collecting biomedical research data in a distrib-
uted environment, e.g., in research networks or when using a hon-
est broker, the distribution of data is often predeﬁned. In these
cases, inconsistencies are rare. If data is inconsistent, this is not a
problem for our protocol and it is also unlikely to result in pri-
vacy-problems. If inconsistencies must be resolved this can either
be done ofﬂine or work on privacy-preserving data cleansing can
be leveraged, e.g., [56,57].
Our approach is based on the semi-honest security model. This
is also a typical assumption, cf. [40,38,42,30,44], and realistic in the
biomedical domain (cf. Section 6.1). Secure communication chan-
nels, which are also required, are typically available and there is
a multitude of protocols that support multi-way negotiation of
cryptographic algorithms and parameters, e.g., [58].
We assume that shared global generalization hierarchies are
available for all quasi-identiﬁers. This is also a common assump-
tion for related approaches. As a result, there cannot be any consis-
tency problems when merging generalization hierarchies in our
protocol. As all rules result from the global generalization hierar-
chies, only duplicates can occur that can easily be removed. Even
pregeneralization, proposed as a countermeasure against fre-
quency attacks, is not a problem. The rules required for pregener-
alized data can either be predeﬁned in the global hierarchies, or
inferred from the global hierarchies by each party for its own pre-
generalized data.
In case of vertical distribution, global hierarchies are trivial to
built. As each party holds a distinct set of attributes, they can
deﬁne their own hierarchies. As a result, complex functions, e.g.,
clustering, can also be used to dynamically create hierarchies for
continuous variables. In the horizontal setup, creating global
hierarchies can be more difﬁcult. For discrete variables this not a
problem, even when these have very large domains. Firstly, only
relevant rules that match at least one value in the dataset are
extracted from the hierarchies and processed. Secondly, hierar-
chies can again be expressed as functions that are shared between
the participants and used to dynamically create generalization
rules only for the existing values. In the horizontal scenario it
has to be made sure that the rules generated for equal values are
consistent amongst all parties. Moreover, rules are generated lo-
cally without having a global view on the dataset. This means that
complex functions for dynamically building generalization hierar-
chies for continuous variables, e.g., clustering, cannot be applied in
this scenario. However, more simple functions, e.g., incrementally
reducing the precision of ﬂoating-point values, can still be used.
Generalization hierarchies are only required for quasi-identiﬁ-
ers and (sometimes) for sensitive attributes. Typical quasi-identiﬁ-
ers are categorical [59]. They are assumed to have a high
reidentiﬁcation risk [60]. This requires attributes to be reproduc-
ible, i.e., have a high chance of repeatedly occurring for an individ-
ual. Moreover, there has to be a high risk of similar data being
available to an attacker [61]. If continuous variables are assumed
to have these properties in a horizontally distributed scenario
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not sufﬁcient, it could be investigated how categorization methods,
such as [62], can be combined with secure set union protocols [63].
7. Conclusions
We have presented a secure multi-party computing protocol
that enables a novel and ﬂexible anonymization method for
distributed data. Prior to the data anonymization procedure an
encrypted global view of the dataset is constructed, which is then
anonymized. Our approach is the ﬁrst to support a broad spectrum
of privacy criteria and anonymization algorithms. This includes
variants of common criteria for protecting datasets from member-
ship, attribute and identity disclosure. The supported methods in-
clude heuristics, including clustering algorithms, and optimal
methods. In our examples we used a globally optimal algorithm
with k-anonymity, ‘-diversity, t-closeness and d-presence. We
have motivated our approach by examples from the biomedical
domain.
We have added an extensive experimental evaluation of our
method and developed an analytical model that can be used to
accurately estimate the overhead caused in terms of computational
costs and transferred data volumes. Our experiments and compar-
isons have shown that it offers highly competitive performance
and thus provides a practical solution for anonymizing distributed
biomedical datasets. Our prototype of a globally optimal algorithm
is the ﬁrst efﬁcient implementation of a such a method in a distrib-
uted environment. According to El Emam et al. this class of
algorithms is very suitable for the biomedical domain [14]. Reasons
include that it results in datasets, which are well suited for
biomedical analyses and provides reproducible and understand-
able results that can be adjusted by non-experts (e.g., by changing
generalization hierarchies or choosing another transformation
from the search space).
In future work, there are multiple ways to extend our concept
and our implementation. For example, ﬁrst experiments have
shown that employing additional data compression methods can
reduce data volumes by a factor of up to 2.5. In case of vertical
distribution, commutative encryption of the data items could be
replaced with symmetric encryption (e.g., AES). This would enable
additional speedups, especially for datasets with many distinct val-
ues. We measured a speedup of roughly 40% for the CUP dataset,
but only 2% for the IHIS dataset.
Further performance gains can be achieved for datasets with
many insensitive attributes. In our current implementation we
handle these analogously to quasi-identifying and sensitive attri-
butes, i.e., we apply commutative encryption. An alternative is to
use a much more efﬁcient symmetric cipher and only encrypt
the keys for this cipher (one key per party) commutatively. This al-
lows the last party to decrypt all insensitive attributes in the anon-
ymized representation.
Our concept can easily be extended to cover hybridly distrib-
uted data. In this case the tuple identiﬁers need to be preserved
during the integration phase, as they are needed to correlate the
individual subsets. The remainder of the protocol can be executed
analogously to the horizontal setup.
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